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Commentary
CIVIL RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE PROSPECT
FOR THE FUTURE*
SYDNEY KENTRIDGE* *

The future of Southern Africa is a dark and difficult subject. I
have taken as the title for this lecture one relatively narrow aspect of
it. What I intend to discuss is the prospect for the recognition and
legal protection of civil rights. But in doing so I can hardly avoid
some consideration of the political future of Southern Africa. One
seldom does that without acquiring strong political opinions or
prejudices. These will doubtless emerge. But I hope that they will
be modified by a lawyer's objectivity and a present distance of 6,000
miles. I shall speak principally of the Republic of South Africa,
where I have lived for most of my life, but I shall refer to other
countries, especially Zimbabwe, where they provide comparisons or
indicate what possibly might lie ahead.
The term "civil rights" is itself full of problems. Are the right
to work and to freedom from poverty civil rights which should be
legally protected? In the United States, Professor Charles Black has
forcefully argued that the pursuit of happiness is a constitutionally
protected right to a reasonable livelihood. I shall not enter into
those realms. First things first, especially in Southern Africa. What
I have in mind are rights which most of us would, without precise
definition, accept as fundamental rights. These rights would include: the right not to be imprisoned, save after conviction on a
* TheJohn Galway Foster Lecture was delivered to a group ofjudges, lawyers, and
members of the general public on November 4, 1986, at the University College in
London, England. The lecture took its name from a celebrated English lawyer who had
a strong and early interest in the protection of human rights.
** Mr. Kentridge is a leading Advocate in South Africa. He is also a Bencher of
Lincoln's Inn in London and a practicing member of the English Bar. He has taught at
Harvard Law School as a Visiting Scholar and has been published in several prominent
journals. Because of the pressing demands of Mr. Kentridge's schedule, he was unable
to provide annotations for his lecture. Nevertheless, the Maryland Law Review believes
that his lecture represents a substantial contribution to the symposium as a complement
to American constitutional thought. We are, therefore, privileged to publish Mr. Kentridge's lecture in its original form. The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to the learning and insight of Professor Jack Spence of the University of Leicester,
England.
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defined charge and a fair trial; the right not to be inhumanly treated;
the right not to be legally discriminated against on the grounds of
colour or race; the right of free movement; the right to private property; freedom of speech; and the right to some form of representation in the government of one's country. For a large part of the
population of the Republic of South Africa some of these rights do
not exist at all, while others exist only in attenuated form. I take it
as self-evident that respect for these rights, in the largest measure
compatible with life in an organised society, is desirable. I know, of
course, that this proposition is not really self-evident. But it is my
starting point, and I shall assume that it is yours.
The protection of these rights by law does not necessarily depend upon constitutional entrenchment. The rights which I have
mentioned have in some measure been protected in this country by
the common law as applied by the courts. This is true of South Africa too. But in South Africa, as in the United Kingdom, the arguments for a constitutional bill of rights are gathering force. In
South Africa the arguments have perhaps a sharper edge. For example, the question of whether whipping should be prohibited as a
cruel and inhuman practice arises from circumstances more acute
than the imposition of correction on a schoolboy by a school
teacher.
When one talks of a foreign legal system, particularly in the
field of civil rights, it may be understood as an exercise in comparative law. The experience of Southern Africa may indirectly tell you
something about the need for a bill of rights in the United Kingdom
or about what one should or should not reasonably expect a bill of
rights to achieve. I undertake not to add to the debate on these
matters. All that I shall allow myself to say, as a relative newcomer
to the legal profession in this country, is that I find it strange that
when issues of fundamental human rights do arise for decision by a
court, you prefer to have them decided in Strasbourg.
It may seem surprising that the first John Foster lecture should
deal with an area of the world which, in the field of civil rights, may
be classed as underdeveloped. It is not for me to ask why I was
invited to give this lecture, but there are, objectively, good reasons
why South Africa is so often in the forefront of discussions on civil
rights. It is not merely because of the historical connections between this country and South Africa, nor even this country's responsibility for having launched the Union of South Africa in 1910. The
interest in South Africa is international and cuts across all conventional divisions of the east and west or north and south. "Why
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should this be?" is the question so often and so plaintively asked in
South Africa. I shall try to give a brief answer.
Human rights have become a major subject of international
concern only since the end of the Second World War. This can be
verified by a glance at the earlier editions of any of the standard
textbooks on international law. Even the 1953 edition of Briggs'
Cases and Materials on International Law has scarcely a mention of
human rights, and then only in relation to the treatment of aliens.
The change no doubt arose from the revulsion against the horrors
perpetrated by the Nazis in Europe. It derived also, I believe, from
the wartime experiences of colonial territories.
The Charter of the United Nations states that the observance of
fundamental rights and freedoms is one of the objects of the organisation. In 1948 the members of the United Nations were called
upon to express their commitment to human rights by approving
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Declaration was
followed by the European Convention on Human Rights and since
then by many other international instruments. These declarations
cover a wide range of rights. But in the post-war world the one
human right which has internationally become the dominating right
is the right to freedom from racial discrimination and, in particular,
from discrimination on the grounds of colour. It was not always so.
After the Great War the Covenant of the League of Nations required religious equality to be observed in the Mandated Territories. Japan, an ally in good standing at that time, proposed a clause
providing also for racial equality. The Japanese proposal was contemptuously brushed aside. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter and article 2 of the Universal Declaration embody what was
refused in 1919.
South Africa has stood alone in refusing to accept racial equality as a fundamental right. I do not for a moment mean that racial
discrimination is practised only in South Africa. For all I know,
there may be worse forms of it elsewhere. But South Africa is peculiar in that discrimination on the ground of race in both private and
public life has been not only legally permissible but legislatively imposed. Notwithstanding recent reforms, that is so even today. Only
a few weeks ago President Botha repeated that residential segregation, school segregation, and the exclusion of blacks from the central political process were not negotiable. And that is the core of
apartheid.
South Africa was a founding member of the United NationsGeneral Smuts was one of the draftsmen of the Charter. But the
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Nationalist government which came into power in 1948 refused to
adhere to the Universal Declaration-joined as well by Saudi Arabia
and the Soviet Union and its satellites. One may see in this refusal a
refreshing absence of hypocrisy, especially when one recalls some of
the countries that did adhere to the Universal Declaration. But,
commendable as it may be to abstain from hypocrisy, it did not save
South Africa from incurring a special opprobrium, intensified further by the fact that the people discriminated against in South Africa
were and are still a voteless majority ruled by a minority of another
race and colour.
There is another factor too. The black population of South Africa has not exactly acquiesced in its subservient status. Consequently, in order to maintain the status quo, it has been necessary
for the South African government to assume powers of a type regarded as extraordinary in Western countries. These powers include the power to ban political organisations, the power to place
individuals under house arrest, and, above all, the power to detain
persons for the purpose of interrogation, without judicial warrant,
without limit of time, and without the right of access to a lawyer or
anyone else. In an exchange of letters with one of her own backbenchers in 1983, Mrs. Thatcher summed up the current state of
South African affairs by saying that "South Africa, by its institutionalised separation of the races, and the repressive measures used to
enforce this policy, is a unique case, and one which arouses particular emotion in the international community."
There is another aspect of South Africa which is of peculiar interest. It is the paradox of the co-existence with discrimination and
repression of a large degree of freedom of speech; of a press which,
save in a state of emergency, is comparatively free and critical; and,
above all, of an independent Supreme Court to which an individual
may resort-not infrequently with success-for protection against
state action. This is a paradox because the South African government, despite its complete parliamentary power and its lack of enthusiasm for any of these institutions, chooses to reluctantly tolerate
them.
There are historical reasons for this degree of toleration which
are too complex to examine here. But it undoubtedly owes much to
the desire of the South African government to be seen as part of the
Western World. This desire also accounts for that "double standard" of which the South African government so often complains.
Why pick on South Africa in a world which includes (to take a random choice among the lesser powers) Uganda, Chile, and Poland?
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A trenchant answer was given by Mrs. Thatcher: "Since the South
Africans assert that they belong to the Western World, they must be
expected to be judged by Western standards."
Let me at this point say a word about the South African legal
system. The following applies not only to the Republic of South
Africa, but to Zimbabwe and the other surrounding states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. In these countries two great systems of law are found, both of which place a high value on the
liberty of the individual. The common law of these countries is the
Roman-Dutch law. It is not always understood that equality under
the law is one of the fundamental precepts of that system. After the
Dutch, the British brought with them to Southern Africa the inestimable benefit of English civil and criminal procedure, including the
basic concept of a fair trial. An independent judiciary also came
from Britain. As early as 1832 in the Cape Colony, judges were appointed to hold office quamdiu se bene gesserit (during good behaviour)
and not merely durante bene placito (at the King's pleasure).
Under these two systems of law the courts have often been able
to protect individuals, both black and white, against the excesses of
executive power. The need to do so, I may add, was there long
before the present South African government came to power. How
did the courts accomplish this in the absence of a bill of rights?
They did it much as the courts have done it in England-by scrutinising the exercise of power to ensure that it was within statutory
or prerogative authority; by a narrow construction of statutes impairing the liberty of the subject; by a presumption of equality
before the law; and by applying the rules of natural justice, in particular, the maxim audi alteram partem (hear both sides).
In 1879 a great case came before the Cape Supreme Court.
There had been an uprising of the Griquas in territory bordering
the eastern Cape Colony, which had been annexed by Britain. Two
captured Griquas had been brought to Cape Town, ostensibly as
prisoners of war. They were held in a military prison without warrant and on no criminal charge. Sir Henry de Villiers, ChiefJustice,
issued a writ of habeas corpus and on the return day ordered their
release. The Crown had argued that the prisoners were dangerous,
and the country was in an unsettled state. But Sir Henry de Villiers
said:
The disturbed state of the country ought not in my opinion
to influence the Court, for its first and most sacred duty is
to administer justice to those who seek it, and not to preserve the peace of the country .... The Civil Courts have
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but one duty to perform, and that is to administer the laws
of the country without fear, favour or prejudice, independently of the consequences which ensue.
These words have often been quoted in South African courts, and
sometimes they have been applied. They have been especially apposite in 1985 and 1986 when, notwithstanding the enormous powers
vested in the executive under the statutory states of emergency,
there have been numerous cases in which the courts, by applying
common-law principles and well-known canons of statutory interpretation, have been able to order the release of detained persons
or to set aside emergency regulations as ultra vires.
These are all good examples of the protection of civil rights,
notwithstanding the absence of a bill of rights. But that, of course,
is not the whole story. The grounds on which executive acts or regulations can be invalidated are limited. In South Africa, as in other
countries, there are some judges who are, in Lord Atkin's phrase,
,'more executive-minded than the executive," or those for whom
"state security" are the magic words which close all doors.
There is also that other part of the British legacy, namely, the
supremacy of Parliament-which is to say the supremacy of the majority party in Parliament. Since 1948 the government has not hesitated to use its parliamentary power to reverse inconvenient
decisions of the courts, particularly those decisions which have
struck down racially discriminatory measures. For example, in 1953
Parliament passed a statute known as the Reservation of Separate
Amenities Act which provided that public premises or public vehicles could be racially segregated, and that there need be no damned
nonsense about equality. It expressly stated that inequality of treatment was not a ground for invalidity. Finally, numerous statutes
have, as direct reactions to court decisions, expressly excluded the
rules of natural justice for purposes of detention, banning orders
and other administrative actions.
This is surely enough to demonstrate that, as valuable as the
judicial process has been, in the absence of an entrenched bill of
rights the judiciary is an inadequate bulwark against a determined
and immoderate government. What difference would a bill of rights
have made in South Africa? It would have invalidated the laws permitting indefinite detention without trial and, at least, the grosser
measures of discrimination in relation to education, residence, and
employment. It would have prevented the forced deprivation of citizenship which followed the creation of the so-called independent
homeland states for blacks. And it would surely have prevented the
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cruellest manifestation of apartheid-the forcible removal of over
four million people from their homes to distant and forlorn resettlement areas.
I have said "surely." But this assumes, of course, a bill of rights
that was not merely on the statute book, but was fully enforced by
the courts and obeyed by the government. However, constitutions
and bills of rights, like other statutes, are subject to changing modes
of interpretation and, in particular, to changing concepts of constitutional purpose. The United States provides sufficient evidence of
this reality.
This is far from denying the value of a bill of rights. It is simply
a suggestion that one should not expect too much from even an entrenched bill of rights. Certainly, we should avoid the fallacy that
freedom is necessarily broader and better protected in a country
with a bill of rights than in a country without a bill of rights. The
late Hedley Bull pointed out that while one could discuss human
rights in both the moral sense and the legal sense, one should not
overlook a third sense, namely, rights in the empirical sense, that is
to say, "rights that we know from experience and observation to be
observed and implemented." I would add, "or not implemented, as
the case may be." In order to assess the real state of human rights
in any particular country, one may get more enlightenment from the
annals of Amnesty International than from the high-sounding professions of national constitutions. Theodore Roosevelt once said
that there is a lot of law at the end of a nightstick. In South Africa
one might say that there is a lot of law at the end of a sjambok.
I referred earlier to a "determined and immoderate government." In a unitary state, as distinct from a state with an elaborate
federal structure, a government with enough at stake politically may
find the means, whether parliamentary or extra-parliamentary, to
overcome the limitations of an entrenched bill of rights. South Africa's close neighbours of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland obtained independence under a standard British post-colonial
constitution, with elaborately entrenched provisions for the protection of parliamentary democracy and of individual rights. It stands
firm in Botswana, but in both Swaziland and Lesotho the constitutions were simply done away with by the parties in power. South
Africa itself, and what was once Southern Rhodesia, also provide
instructive examples.
In the 1950s the South African government attempted to remove the entrenched political rights of the Coloured people of the
Cape without the two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament
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as required by the South Africa Act of 1909. This attempt was frustrated by the unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court. But both the entrenched provisions of the South
Africa Act and the judgment of the Appellate Division were overcome by the expedient of packing not only the upper house (the
Senate) but, to make doubly sure, the Appellate Division as well.
In Southern Rhodesia the story was different, but the outcome
was similarly depressing. The Constitution of Southern Rhodesia of
1961 included an elaborate and entrenched bill of rights. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 was a bloodless coup. It was obviously and unashamedly unconstitutional. Two
persons detained by the Smith regime challenged their detention on
the ground of the illegality of Ian Smith's government and all its
measures. The Rhodesianjudges held office under the Constitution
of Southern Rhodesia of 1961 and had taken oaths of allegiance to
the Queen. Yet the Rhodesian Appellate Division, early in 1968, by
a majority of four to one, "recognised" the Smith government as the
de facto government of Rhodesia and held that its acts must be accorded validity. Only Justice Fieldsend dissented. He held, not surprisingly, but courageously in the circumstances, that the court
appointed under the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia of 1961
could not recognise the existence of a rebel de facto government
within the territory of its own jurisdiction. In the end all the Rhodesianjudges but two went over to Mr. Smith and took office under his
new constitution. The Privy Council entertained an appeal from the
Rhodesian judgment and reversed it, but the Smith government refused to recognise the Privy Council. All in all, this was hardly a
victory for the judicial protection of civil rights in Southern Africa,
but I should perhaps disclose that I was the unsuccessful counsel
before the Rhodesian courts.
This does not mean that the existence of entrenched constitutional protection is meaningless. In Rhodesia an early and firm reaction by the courts might have changed the unhappy course of that
country's history. Certainly, the Smith government waited on the
final judgment of the Rhodesian court before asserting what it regarded as the ultimate power of government, namely, the power to
hang people. Justice Fieldsend said in his dissent in the UDI case:
Judges appointed to office under a written constitution,
which provides certain fundamental laws and restricts the
manner in which those laws can be altered, must not allow
rights under that constitution to be violated. This is a lasting duty for so long as they hold office, whether the viola-
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tion be by peaceful or revolutionary means.... Nothing
can encourage instability more than for any revolutionary
movement to know that, if it succeeds in snatching power,
it will be entitled ipso facto to the complete support of the
pre-existing judiciary in their judicial capacity. It may be a
vain hope that the judgment of a court will deter a usurper,
or have the effect of restoring legality, but for a court to be
deterred by fear of failure is merely to acquiesce in illegality. It may be that the court's mere presence exercises
some check on a usurper who prefers to avoid a confrontation with it.
So much for the past. What of the future? I have already indicated that I have no particular qualification for predicting the future
course of events in South Africa, but that is not ordinarily a deterrent to prophecy. My own predictions, for what they are worth, are
cautious enough. First, I do not see revolution around the corner.
The South African government is powerful and is determined to
maintain its rule by all necessary use of force. It will, I believe, remain in control for many years to come. But, secondly, the everincreasing numbers, and the growing militancy and economic power
of the black population, must, in due course, end the present state
of affairs. The result will be the existence of a new form of government in which blacks will have a dominant position in accordance
with their numbers, whether as a parliamentary majority or otherwise. My own guess is that this is likely to come about by the end of
the century.
What are the prospects for the judicial protection of civil rights,
both before and after the inevitable changeover? Self-evidently, the
answer must depend on what happens in the interim. If there is a
protracted civil war, South Africa, as a single political entity, might
no longer exist. But I am optimistic enough to believe that,
although it is unlikely that change will be entirely nonviolent, events
in South Africa could well lead to a negotiated settlement. This settlement in turn will lead to a government with a black majority that
will take the form of a constitutional government and not a mere
dictatorship. This is a large conclusion. But I must add yet another
large statement-the African National Congress is bound to have an
important part in that government. This means, as I see it, that
there is likely to be a strong, and possibly dominant, socialist element in a future South African government. What is this likely to
mean in relation to civil rights?
First, some general observations. The civil rights which I have
been discussing are rights that we usually think of in terms of the
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individuals whose freedom they protect. This, on the whole, is the
Western way of thinking about civil rights. It is not the only way.
The Third World, especially in Africa, has perhaps concentrated
more on the collective rights of peoples. The right of racial equality
has been seen not so much as the right of an individual not to be
discriminated against on the basis of his race, but rather as the right
of a black population to be liberated as a people from colonialism or
white rule. Protection from arbitrary executive action may in this
context be thought of as attainable merely by throwing off the yoke
of an unelected government, rather than by entrenching rights
which are enforceable by the individual against an elected government. Further, many black political thinkers (and not merely Marxists) regard the major problems of South Africa to be poverty and
economic inequality, and believe these problems could best be redressed not by a bill of rights, but by means of a redistribution of
wealth, possibly in the form of a nationalisation of major industries.
However unpromising that may seem as a route to economic prosperity, we would be wrong to ignore this view. It is a powerful element in black political thought in Southern Africa and, in view of the
political and economic history of the region, it is a wholly understandable one.
These considerations help to explain why the current debate on
a bill of rights for South Africa has taken what may seem to be a
curious turn. Over the last fifteen or twenty years an increasing
number of lawyers, and even some judges, have pointed out the
need for a bill of rights in South Africa. This call was taken up by
white opposition parties, other than those to the far right, and by
some black leaders as well. It obtained no response at all from the
government. This was not strange. Most of the government's cherished racial laws and many of its security laws could obviously not
stand against any Western concept of a bill of rights. In 1978 a leading South African writer on the subject said that "both an entrenched bill of rights in a federal setting and the less powerful
unentrenched Canadian-type bill of rights must appear a Utopian
dream to South African libertarians at this time." The South African public, he said, required education on the advantages of a bill of
rights.
Since then the South African public has indeed had an education, although not an academic one. What has educated it has been
the manifest and disastrous failure of the government's racial legislation and of its security legislation as well. There is the growing
realisation that apartheid has brought only violence and economic

1987]

CIVIL RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

decline, that unbridled police powers not only do not bring peace
but are self-defeating because of the resentment that they create
among those subject to them.
So, the call for a bill of rights has broadened. It now comes
even from academics at Afrikaans language universities (hitherto
not in the forefront of the fight for civil rights) and from newspapers
which support the government. Justice Kotze, a recently retired
judge of the Appellate Division, said at a congress in Pretoria this
year that the security legislation of the country had done irreparable
damage. Pardonably exaggerating, he said he believed that every
member of the Bench regretted that there was so strong a tendency
to give executive authorities unbridled discretion to assail human
rights. The answer, he said, lay in the granting of power to the
country's highest court to test contraventions of human rights.
Now the government itself has begun to take notice. In April of
1986, the South African Minister of Justice instructed the South African Law Commission to investigate the desirability of the introduction of a bill of rights and the protection of group rights. In
September at the Transvaal Congress of the Nationalist Party, the
Minister of Justice said of the introduction of a bill of rights that
"the question was not when, but how." But he added that human
rights are to be dealt with "not on a universal basis in every respect
...but also against the socio-economic background that prevails in
a particular country"-words which one is ordinarily more accustomed to hearing from thinkers rather more to the left than Mr.
Coetsee.
His speech, if I may say so, was a sensible one--quite out of
place at a Transvaal Congress of the Nationalist Party. But the new
popularity of a bill of rights among sections of the white population
has unfortunately produced a negative reaction from some black
leaders. They interpret this belated concern with a bill of rights as
the reaction of a governing group which sees that its time is running
out and wants a bill of rights to protect its existing privileges. There
is also a feeling that the new interest in a bill of rights places undue
emphasis on the protection of property-which in practical terms
means the property of whites.
Why, many blacks ask, this sudden enthusiasm for the legal protection of minority rights when, over all the years, the rights of the
majority have had little protection from the law. It is not easy to
answer this pointed question. But I do not believe that these suspicions are to be equated with a firm rejection of a bill of rights.
Although we may be years from real negotiation, most political
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forces in South Africa (including the African National Congress)
speak in terms of an ultimate negotiated settlement albeit, naturally
enough, subject to differing conditions precedent. If an entrenched
bill of rights would make majority rule more palatable to minorities,
it may well have to be accepted by the majority.
This may sound foolishly sanguine. But there is good reason to
believe that the African National Congress, notwithstanding the
Marxist element in its ranks, does not exclude a bill of rights from
its thinking. Possibly the most important single document in black
political history in South Africa is a document called the Freedom
Charter. It was adopted by the African National Congress in 1955
and is now supported by many black political groups inside the
country. It is a document based largely on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with the admixture of some basic socialist
prescriptions. Among the latter is the statement that "the mineral
wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry, shall be
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole." On the
other hand, it also states that "[aIll people shall have equal rights to
trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades,
crafts and professions." In part the Freedom Charter expresses
what can only be called general aspirations. For example, it demands that "[r]ent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and
no one shall go hungry." Among the provisions which would not be
out of place in a constitutional bill of rights are others such as these:
Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and
stand as candidate for all bodies which make laws; the
rights of the people shall be the same regardless of race,
colour or sex. No one shall be imprisoned, deported or
restricted without fair trial. No one shall be condemned by
the order of any government official. The privacy of the
house from police raids shall be protected by law.
This is not a sophisticated document, but it is not one to be
ignored or despised. The clauses about nationalisation should certainly be taken seriously. A writer who does not speak for the African National Congress but who, I believe, shares a lot of its thinking
has recently written in favour of a bill of rights in a democratic (i.e.,
in his terms a black-ruled) South African state. But this is what he
had to say about the right of property:
What would be quite inappropriate for a bill of rights [in
South Africa] would be a property clause which had the effect of ensuring that 87% of land and 95% of the productive capacity of the country continued to remain in the
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hands of the white minority. It is one thing to have a guaranteed right to personal property.... It is quite another to
say that one should have a constitutional right to own a
gold mine or a farm of 100,000 hectares.
I suspect that a black government of South Africa is likely to think
very much on these lines, although it may be influenced by the examples of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, which show that even governments with strong socialist pretensions are compelled to
recognise the value of private enterprise and to seek Western aid
and investment.
Allowing for all its deficiencies, the growth of support for the
Freedom Charter seems to me a good augury. Of course, it may be
that its professions are no more than the easy promises of a party in
opposition. It may be that, if that party did come to power, the
promises will be forgotten. Or they might be incorporated in a constitution with no machinery to make them effective. Or they may be
so hedged with exceptions as to be valueless. Perhaps at this stage it
would be useful to look at the experience of Zimbabwe.
It is common in South Africa for politicians to point to
Zimbabwe as either a dreadful or a shining example of what a blackruled South Africa might be like. In Zimbabwe whites have no political power, but, as a group, their lives and property are secure. This
is not so because of Zimbabwe's bill of rights, but because such is
the policy of Mr. Mugabe's government. The Constitution of
Zimbabwe, which was founded upon a negotiated political and military settlement, includes a comprehensive declaration of rights on
the standard British post-colonial model. It protects personal liberty, freedom of speech, the right to trial by due process of law, and
rights of private property. It also, however, contains the common
exception found in these constitutions-that in periods of public
emergency certain rights, including the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, may be suspended.
This provision has enabled Mr. Mugabe's government simply to
take over and renew Mr. Smith's emergency regulations. The state
of emergency declared by Mr. Smith in 1965, shortly before UDI,
has been regularly renewed every six months, originally by Mr.
Smith's Parliament and, since 1980, by Mr. Mugabe's Parliament.
This means that the intervention of the courts with respect to persons held under preventive detention is possible only when the action taken by the state is in conflict with its own regulations or goes
beyond the terms of the constitutional exception for states of public
emergency. Within these limits the High Court and Supreme Court
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of Zimbabwe have done what they could to protect individuals
against abuses of power. In so doing, they have come under strong
and intemperate attack by individual Zimbabwe Cabinet ministers.
Yet, Mr. Mugabe has distanced himself from these criticisms and has
shown a commitment to the independence of the judiciary. In particular, the three judges whom he has appointed in succession to the
office of Chief Justice have all been men of great distinction and
independence-Justice Fieldsend (who resigned from the High
Court of Southern Rhodesia after UDI), Justice Telford Georges
(now Chief Justice of the Bahamas), and the present Chief Justice,
Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, the first black Zimbabwean to hold this
office.
But notwithstanding the standards set by the judiciary,
Zimbabwe is an example of the conflict between the legal and the
empirical in the field of human rights. The exception for public
emergencies does not derogate from section 15 of the Constitution,
which provides that no person shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading punishment. Yet investigation by, among
others, Amnesty International and the American Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights (neither of which organisations is unsympathetic to Zimbabwe) shows that assault upon and torture of
detainees by the security police are rife. The fact that the practices
described in their reports were inherited from the previous regime
is hardly an excuse. In practice the treatment of political detainees
in Zimbabwe, a country with a bill of rights, is not very different
from the treatment of political detainees in South Africa, a country
with no bill of rights. If I may speak from my professional experience, as well as from the study of other evidence, I would say that
for sheer nastiness there is little to choose between the security police of the two countries.
Once again, this raises the question of whether a bill of rights is
of any real value in the face of a government of autocratic tendencies which believes, rightly or wrongly, that it is faced with a state of
emergency. I should say that the experience of Zimbabwe is yet another lesson that one must not expect too much from a bill of rights.
But a reading of the Zimbabwe Law Reports shows that a bill of
rights is by no means futile. Let me take one recent example. An
attorney who was taking photographs of the scene of an accident
involving his client was arrested by members of the Central Intelligence Organisation on suspicion of a breach of the Official Secrets
Act. He alleged that he had been assaulted and sued for damages.
One of the emergency regulations in Zimbabwe provides for indem-
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nity to any member of the security forces with respect to anything
done in good faith for the purposes of the preservation of the security of Zimbabwe. The regulation further empowers the responsible
minister to issue a certificate to that effect. Such a certificate is
prima facie proof of what it says. In this case, the minister issued
just such a certificate. But five justices of the Supreme Court held
that insofar as the regulation left the question of good faith to the
subjective determination of the minister, it was unconstitutional and
invalid. The certificate was therefore a nullity and the case could
proceed on its merits.
The Zimbabwe example contrasted with a similar case which
arose in South West Africa, a territory still subject to the laws of the
Republic of South Africa. Under the South African Defence Act any
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, instituted against a member
of the South African Defence Force is barred if the State President
issues a certificate stating that in his opinion the defendant had acted in good faith for the purpose of the prevention of terrorism.
Earlier this year, the Attorney General of South West Africa saw fit
to indict four members of the South West African Territorial Defence Force on charges of murder. They were alleged to have
beaten and kicked their victim to death. The State President, Mr.
Botha, caused the requisite certificate to be issued, whereupon the
criminal prosecution lapsed and the accused persons went free. Unlike the Zimbabwe case, there was no bill of rights against which the
certificate could be tested.
One must add, however, that according to the reports of the
organisations I have referred to, it sometimes happens that judgments against the Zimbabwe government are simply ignored. Indeed, the Zimbabwean Minister ofJustice recently said openly that it
was "an impossible dream" for the state to abide by all judgments.
It was for the state to decide which judgments it would abide by. No
such thing has happened in the Republic of South Africa.
The example of Zimbabwe, if I may sum up, shows that a bill of
rights in such a society is not a dead letter. As long as there is an
independent judiciary, it gives a protection which would not otherwise be available. But in the face of a government which shows no
great commitment to individual liberty in its executive actions a bill
of rights is no guarantee for freedom and justice.
Mr. Mugabe has recently announced that the Roman-Dutch
criminal law, which he sees as a link with the system of apartheid, is
to be supplanted by a socialist system of penal law which will "replace punishment with rehabilitation and reorientation," not only of
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criminals but also, in his reported words, "of other social deviants."
What this will mean in practice and how it is to co-exist with the
Declaration of Rights can at present only be a matter for more or
less gloomy speculation.
What does this tell us of the prospects for the Republic of
South Africa? On the negative side, even if there were a bill of
rights, it would be easy enough for a new government, under colour
of a real or imagined emergency, simply to apply existing security
legislation against its opponents. There are, however, reasons why
one may not unrealistically hope for something better.
In the first place, as I have pointed out, the Freedom Charter
gives ground for believing that respect for individual rights has
some place in the policies of the black opposition. Secondly, the
varied racial and social elements in South Africa make it unlikely
that in any future constitutional arrangement any one group would
be able to take over the monopoly of power which the present South
African government enjoys. There is no group in South Africa
which has the same dominant position as the Shona-speaking people of Zimbabwe, who make up about three-quarters of that country's population. Whereas Zimbabwe's white population was never
above a quarter of a million, which is less than five percent of the
total Zimbabwean population, South Africa's whites are between
four and five million, or about fifteen percent of the total South African population. There are also the considerable Coloured and
Asian communities. As far as I know, no major black opposition
group in South Africa seeks the exclusion of these millions of citizens from the political process. Finally, the tribal divisions among
the black population itself, although much exaggerated by the South
African government, are not without significance.
Above all, the conflict is one which both sides must ultimately
realise cannot be won outright. A military victory against the formidable South African armed forces by black insurgents or a successful
violent revolution in the near future are hardly realistic possibilities.
But the government's policy of "pacification" by a mixture of force
and peripheral reforms is just as unlikely to succeed. If the conflict
is to continue unresolved, the prospect is thus one of limited but
ceaseless violence against the forces of the state and, eventually, the
white population. This violence will be reinforced by industrial action and internal boycotts, and will in turn be met by repression of
an increasingly violent and unpleasant nature-repression which
will have only temporary and local success. This process is likely to
entail a lengthening of the present two-year period of conscription
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for all young white men, many of whom are already unhappy about
serving in what they see as the defence of apartheid. In addition,
the violence and the unrest would be accompanied by foreign divestment on both economic and political grounds, leading to a decline in the economy and the quality of life for nearly everyone.
This prospect, however appalling, is not likely to lead either side to
an unconditional surrender. Reason therefore suggests that both
sides can be convinced that a negotiated settlement is preferable to
an endless conflict. A negotiated settlement would rationally include an agreed upon constitutional structure containing some restraint on absolute parliamentary or executive power.
This optimistic vision may prove to be entirely wrong. It may
be argued that the path of rationality is not obvious. Young black
militants have introduced two new and fearful terms into South Africa's political vocabulary: the "necklace" and the bomb in the
crowded shopping centre, killing both blacks and whites, are regarded as legitimate revolutionary operations. On the other side,
the police resort to tactics of terror-the whip and the shotgun are
used against black children without discernible compunction. Some
black leaders talk as though victory were around the corner. On the
other side, the government, while disavowing the word "apartheid,"
clings to its essential doctrines and practices. Those on the right of
the government wish to go back to the pure doctrine of apartheid as
practiced by Dr. Verwoerd. One is tempted to say, both of the government and of the right wing, what Gibbon said of another people,
that they "yield a stronger and more ready assent to the traditions of
their remote ancestors than to the evidence of their own senses."
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I believe that South Africa still
has time in hand. Although there is already endemic unrest in
South Africa, with horrifying violence on both sides, this violence is
well short of civil war. Moreover, a significant number of whites,
including influential members of the business community and
others who were previously at least tacit supporters of the government, are joining with blacks in calling not merely for reform but for
the complete dismantling of apartheid, as well as the recognition of
and negotiation with the African National Congress. They accept
what only a few years ago would have been unthinkable, namely, the
extension of political rights to blacks on a one person, one vote basis. If the time left is not to be squandered, I have no doubt that one
of the most positive acts which the South African government can be
urged to do is to enact at once an effective bill of rights.
By an effective bill of rights I mean a statute which would pro-
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vide a real restraint on arbitrary executive action; which would preclude indefinite detention without trial; which would prevent forced
removals of communities; which would undo bans on political organisations and individuals, so as to allow them to carry on open
political activity; and which would dismantle apartheid by making
discrimination on the grounds of race or colour actually illegal.
Why, it may be asked, should this statute be enacted at this late
stage?
I have spoken of the government of Zimbabwe as a government
with no real commitment to the protection of individual rights. The
same is still basically true of the South African government, notwithstanding its new openness to a bill of rights. Why should any future
South African government have a greater commitment? If individual
rights are to be protected, it is the people of the country who must
feel that commitment. That commitment may come, I believe, from
the experience of a bill of rights in effective operation. In its report
on Zimbabwe, the American Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights
quotes a Zimbabwean lawyer of long experience who spoke of the
operation of law in Southern Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front
government. He said: "Most blacks grew up thinking the law was
the enemy. It never occurred to them to seek redress of their grievances in the courts. It was absurd. They knew it would be fruitless,
that the deck was always stacked against them."
The attitude of the black population concerning the law in
South Africa is, in my experience, very similar. The instances ofjudicial protection of individual rights which I have given are not representative of a black person's experience of the law in South Africa.
In general, a black person in South Africa is on the receiving end of
the law. His ordinary experience of the operation of the innumerable apartheid laws and regulations has taught him that the process
of law is merely an instrument of government, there to enforce the
dictates of apartheid. If South Africa is to have a government of
laws in the future, whatever time is left must be used to ensure that
the popular perception of law changes radically-that it is seen as a
protector of the individual, especially the black individual.
This brings me back to the factor of international concern.
Over the past twenty or twenty-five years international law and practise have rapidly developed in the direction of recognising the right
of the international community to intervene, by any means short of
force, to prevent or redress domestic violations of human rights.
The existence of the system of apartheid has been central to this
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departure from the traditional concept of a domestic jurisdiction beyond the reach of international law.
The Declaration on Non-Intervention of the General Assembly
of the United Nations in 1965 proclaimed that every state has "an
inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural
systems without interference in any form by another state." But
even this inalienable right is overridden by the superior principle,
stated in the same Declaration, that "[a]ll states should contribute to
the complete elimination of racial discrimination in all its forms and
manifestations." In the early 1950s states such as Sweden took the
position, in relation to the issue of apartheid, that the United Nations Assembly had no right to request alterations in the domestic
laws of a member state. The United Kingdom's view at that time
was that the Assembly was not entitled even to discuss the matter.
Now, in 1986, most Western countries consider it legitimate,
and indeed a matter of duty, not only to express strong views on
apartheid but to assist in bringing it down. Even the governments
of the United Kingdom and the United States, which in this sphere
prefer restraint to radicalism, have adopted economic measures to
that end. In her first address to the United Nations the President of
the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino, felt it right to speak of the need for all
members to play their part in bringing about change in South Africa. Those governments who do not favour economic sanctions
against South Africa are not necessarily opposed to other forms of
intervention. As Sir Geoffrey Howe has explained, the dispute is
one of method-what is the most effective way of bringing about the
ending of apartheid? This attitude assumes that the ending of
apartheid will be a good in itself. That is surely right. The wickedness and cruelty of that system are incapable of any defence.
But one hopes that the effort of ending apartheid would be rewarded by the emergence of a society in which basic civil rights are
respected and enforced. I would say that the best contribution
which Western governments could make to this long-term objective
is to persuade the South African government, by all appropriate
means, to adopt a genuine and effective bill of rights now.
I am conscious that underlying everything that I have said is an
acceptance of the Western view of civil and human rights. Hedley
Bull, whom I have already quoted, has said that there is a tendency
in Western countries to believe that the human rights problem is
essentially the problem of how Western countries are to use their
influence to bring the socialist countries and the countries of the
Third World into line on human rights. He said, perhaps somewhat
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scornfully, that the public appeal of human rights as an object of a
foreign policy derives in large measure from the belief that the
guardianship of human rights in the world is the special vocation of
the Western countries. But that seems to me an entirely admirable
vocation. It is surely right that Western countries, if their professions are sincere, should use what influence and power they have to
persuade other countries of the value of these rights and to induce
them to recognise and protect them. In the case of South Africa the
Western nations have a real opportunity to do so. I hope that they
will not let it go by default.

